AMERICA'S 2 Armies

By RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR.

The fundamental fact is that the United States will be an air and naval power, not a land power . . . it should not be in the business of preparing expeditionary forces which will never sail. . . .[1]

Soldiers advancing during Roaring Lion.

U.S. Air Force (Efrain Gonzalez)

Marines leaving landing site.

U.S. Marine Corps (Michael T. Huff)

Prior to the Persian Gulf War, many experts predicted the end of large-scale land warfare. As that conflict proved, however, ground forces that can be deployed over strategic distances and win decisive battles remain the basic currency of the military. The United States has enjoyed the luxury of two overlapping land forces for years, the Army and the Marine Corps. We have two services which see their core business as sustained land operations. Today, we are in the midst of harsh defense cuts. It is time to face the fact that America can no longer afford two armies.

A major effort to reexamine the roles and missions of the Armed Forces is now underway. It should look hard and carefully at the propensity of the Marine Corps to wage major operations on land. Given the statutory mandate of the Army to fight the Nation's wars on land and the cost of fielding two rival land forces, the time has come for the Marine Corps to return to its traditional mission of amphibious operations and forego major land operations.

For various reasons the military has maintained redundant capabilities in the air and on the ground for more than forty years. But the willingness of the polity to support them is eroding as the strength of arguments mustered to defend them is waning. Simply put, much of what Army and Marine ground forces do is the same. This fact may discomfit some, but it must be explored.

The Argument

Armies have two characteristics which are central and defining: first, they are organized on a regular footing as an independent military service; and second, their core function is sustained land combat. The Marine Corps passes muster with flying colors on both counts. Indeed, Marine forces that fought in the Gulf were larger and more capable than many regular armies of the world, and they performed functions ashore indistinguishable from those of their Army brethren.

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For much of their history marines provided naval commanders with both elite security and on-board striking forces for amphibious landings and raids. The marines or naval infantry of most major nations retain that role and serve as fleet auxiliaries, usually organized along regimental lines to conduct amphibious raids or spearhead landings ahead of conventional ground troops. For the Marine Corps, however, all that changed on the eve of World War II.

Pearl Harbor committed the United States to amphibious warfare on a grand scale. The military power of Japan in the Pacific was based on occupying island archipelagos and holding the naval anchorages and airfields found there. In the unique circumstances of the Central Pacific war, extensive amphibious operations made sense. While Army units conducted numerous amphibious assaults (including landings in the Southwest Pacific, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Southern France, and the largest amphibious invasion in history, Normandy), the Navy-Marine Corps team evolved into a large, extraordinarily capable instrument of maritime and amphibious warfare.

By 1945 the Marines had grown to six large divisions supported by strong organic air forces. The post-war era saw the Marine Corps entrench itself as an independent service, complete with a hefty training base (including separate staff and war colleges) and its own bureaucracy in Washington. Today the active Marine Corps establishment supports three four-star generals: the commandant, a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs; the assistant commandant; and, on a rotating basis, the Commander in Chief, Central Command, as well as the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command.

More than sixty Marine generals oversee a force whose active combat strength amounts to three divisions and three aircraft wings with supporting logistical units. Of the more than 18,000 commissioned officers, fewer than 8,000 actually serve "with the fleet" (that is, in operational billets with ground divisions or air wings), and many serve in officer-intensive aviation units which duplicate functions found in the Navy and Air Force such as strike aviation, air refueling, and electronic warfare.[2] The balance occupy billets in the Pentagon, serve on joint staffs[3] and in American embassies abroad, or are in various Marine headquarters or training assignments throughout the United States and overseas.[4]

The presence of so many officers in non-operational billets is common in the other services, which must maintain large training establishments, provide for systems procurement and research and development, and perform all the other functions associated with raising, equipping, and training large active and Reserve forces. But the Marine Corps has few of these responsibilities. Its Reserve structure consists of one division and one air wing scattered across the country. Much of its hardware is developed by other services. It has no significant reconstitution or mobilization responsibility and no requirement to plan global land campaigns. It has no field army headquarters or echelons above corps, no National Guard establishment, no Corps of Engineers to adminis-

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ter in every state and territory. The entire combat echelon of the active Marine Corps, moreover, is about the size of the Army's III Corps at Fort Hood. Most Marine officers, therefore, perform functions that help the Corps compete on an equal footing as a powerful, full-fledged service, not an integral part of the Fleet Marine Force.

If the status of the Marine Corps as a coequal, independent service is well established, what is the evidence that its principal, core business is land warfare? Except for their glorious exploits in the Central Pacific during World War II, modern marines have done very little by way of large amphibious operations. But they have a long and varied experience with protracted operations on land.

In World War I, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, Marine units from brigade to corps size fought inland under Army commanders. Marines have often had roles indistinguishable from those of Army units in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), such as in the Los Angeles riots and Provide Comfort as well as disaster relief after Hurricane Andrew. In fact, the sight of marines operating inland beside the Army has become so familiar that most Americans, and most political leaders, fail to see an obvious redundancy. This is not to suggest that, virtually without exception, the Marines have not performed brilliantly in these operations. But it does raise a compelling question in these austere times. Why do we have two separate services doing the same thing?

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces to combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the protection of a naval campaign. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.

—National Security Act of 1947

This preoccupation with sustained operations ashore is unavoidable for the Marine Corps. Like all healthy organizations it wants to preserve itself and expand in size and importance. The problem is that there are few opportunities to conduct large-scale amphibious landings. Sometimes landings are staged anyway, as when the Marines went ashore at Danang[5] and Mogadishu. On the rare occasion when an amphibious assault becomes a true operational option, such as in the Gulf War, the combination of modern technology (such as Silkworm and Exocet missiles) and primitive technology (such as high density floating mines) make major amphibious operations exceedingly dangerous.[6] To maintain organizational viability under these conditions, marines must engage in conventional operations ashore that look very much like traditional land warfare, inevitably raising the question: why does America have two armies?

Counting the Cost

For more than forty years the simple explanation for having two armies was that we could afford them. The Cold War provided a ready rationale for defense budgets, and the Marines were so firmly entrenched as a full-fledged service that no argument about redundancy could be made that was compelling enough to overcome its inherent political advantages. The same may hold true today; no matter how scarce resources become, the Marines' hold on public imagination may guarantee them a place as a separate service which fights on land. But while this may be construed as evidence of the organizational solvency and vitality of the Marine Corps, it is a poor substitute for rationally defined roles and missions in a sharply constrained budget environment.

The costs of maintaining two armies, however, go beyond tax dollars. As painful as it may be to reopen old wounds, the record of Army/Marine cooperation in battle is littered with the debris of interservice rivalry. From Saipan to Seoul, Khe Sanh to Desert One, Point Salines and Panama City to Wadi al Batin, the Army and Marine Corps have clashed over roles and missions.[7]

This historical record does not imply the existence of intentional parochialism or deliberate hostility among the services. This is a point that warrants repeating: differing opinions on the use of military forces do not necessarily suggest personal shortsightedness. Most military leaders, and marines in particular, have a keen sense of cooperation and selflessness born of years of team work in peace and war. Nor do marines bear all or even most of the blame for recurring tension. But there are reasons for the lack of close links between the Army and Marine Corps. Each service practices its own tried and tested operational routines and defends its preroga-

tives and autonomy if threatened. Marine commanders are understandably reluctant to be placed under Army command, even when the preponderance of ground forces in a theater are Army as happened in World War I, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. Loss of operational autonomy to another service has never been greeted with equanimity.

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Indeed this is just the point. Service perspectives can be fused into truly joint planning and execution when their responsibilities are grounded in the fundamental dimensions of land, sea, and air operations which define core competencies. It is only at dimensional margins, where defining competencies collide, that the services must genuinely reconcile competing views. One illustration is the highly visible and apparently unresolvable differences among the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force over theater fixed-wing air assets. When two services contend in one dimension, as the Army and Marines must do, they must perforce exist under a fragile truce, punctuated by recurring budget and doctrinal debates in peacetime and accommodation and sometimes violent disagreement in time of war. Over the years the two services have by and large made things work; but the record shows that they have done so in spite of their unique service perspectives and not because of them.

Aside from traditional aversions, basic organizational problems can confound well-meaning attempts to integrate Army and Marine forces in sustained operations on land. A principal cause is the lack of logistical wherewithal in the Marine Corps to wage sustained ground campaigns at the operational level of war. Alone—or in concert with the Navy—Marines cannot field and sustain themselves ashore for long. Lacking operational sinews of war on land, the Marines must remain tied to the beach, or move inland and be linked to Army life-support systems.

Laymen often fail to realize what is involved in supporting land operations. Only the Army has brigade-sized artillery, armored cavalry, engineer, psychological operations, civil affairs, and military police units; only the Army fields high altitude air defense, intelligence, special operations, transportation, signal brigades and groups, as well as extensive corps-level logistics, maintenance, ammunition, and material handling units which make campaigning at the operational level possible over months and even years. Even in a relatively small operation such as the Kurdish relief effort in northern Iraq and humanitarian operations in Somalia, these capabilities proved to be essential. For larger and more protracted operations on land, they provide the difference between short-term tactical operations and long-term operational and theater strategic operations.

In brief, as a stand-alone formation, the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is configured for short-term operations near the beach. Beyond that arena, logistics and the command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure needed to support extended operations must come from the Army.[8] And if taxpayers are paying for Marine divisions to fight like Army divisions and be sustained in the field by Army logistics, supported by Army tanks and artillery, and flanked by Army combat formations,

Marine tank coming ashore.

U.S. Marine Corps (R.D. Clayton)

Army tank conducting live fire exercise in Egypt.

U.S. Army (Jeffrey T. Brady)

then the boundary separating the core business of the two services is blurred indeed.

Corps Business

To be sure the Marines do have unique capabilities which must be preserved. The ability to organize and conduct amphibious landings and raids is an important part of our strategic repertoire. Self-contained Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) built around infantry battalions with aviation and logistics assets can be invaluable when stationed off potential trouble spots to evacuate U.S. nationals or perform missions where presence is critical. By stationing bulk stores and equipment at sea in Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPSs), the Marines can deploy sizable forces to hot spots and, under certain conditions, conduct a forced entry from the sea. Both Marine security guards at American embassies and Marine ceremonial units play vital roles as representatives of the Nation at home and abroad. Not least, the Marines possess an ethos and elan which is a national treasure. They have earned their place through sacrifice and victory in battle.

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These important capabilities, however, are not enough to justify separate status as a second army. As noted above, an ability to play in conventional land warfare is imperative in justifying the large overhead of the Marine Corps. Over the years, Marine aviation has grown far beyond its original focus on close support of ground formations to incorporate a strike capability that reaches out many hundreds of miles. M1A1 heavy tanks and M198 155 mm howitzers have been added to Marine divisions.

Marine logisticians are now analyzing what steps should be taken to give the Corps a true theater sustainment capability of its own.[9] In the late 1980s light armored vehicle (LAV) battalions were fielded in Marine divisions, and the Corps has considered organizing a heavy regiment in each division composed of tank and LAV units—in essence, a duplication of Army heavy brigades. At a time when other services have fought and lost the battle to maintain the end strengths proposed in the Bush administration base force, the Marines fought successfully to prevent their end strength from being reduced to a base force level of 159,100.[10]

These and similar initiatives have little to do with amphibious operations and everything to do with sustained, high intensity land warfare. The push to entrench this expanded capability for land warfare is reflected in official publications which tout the ability to deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces "with speed and reach, yet with the firepower, tactical mobility and sustainment of heavier forces."[11]

Some question whether the Army should field non-mechanized divisions at all, suggesting that all land warfare below the high intensity threshold should be the province of the Marine Corps. Aside from giving the Department of the Navy the lead military department in land warfare (due to the relative infrequency of major high intensity conflicts), this proposal ignores the fact that the Army can sustain its light forces ashore with comprehensive operational level combat support and combat service support which does not exist in the Marine Corps. Army light forces also possess unique capabilities to conduct large-scale airborne and air assault operations and an unmatched ability to fight at night in close terrain. Perhaps more importantly, the Army's long experience with light forces and statutory primacy in land warfare—as well as a proven track record—argue against elimination of Army light forces.

Such proposals suggest far more than a need to mount a credible amphibious assault capability. In fact, since the Navy only has enough amphibious assault shipping to project two and a half brigade-sized elements of Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) at any given time, half of the Marine combat echelon must travel and offload in secure locations rather than conduct the type of maritime forced entry which is ostensibly its *raison d'etre*.[12]

Expeditionary Warfare

Is it not possible that the future of the Corps could—and should—be uncoupled from the future of amphibious operations?[13]

Without colliding head on with the Army's established primacy in land warfare, the Marine Corps justifies its excess forces in a range of broader claims. The principal claim is that the world of expeditionary warfare belongs to maritime forces. Naval doctrine holds that Marine forces can and should engage in large-scale, sustained land combat so long as it comes "from the sea." Army forces thus play supporting roles in all but the largest and most intense forms of land warfare.[14] After the initial entry into an area or theater of war, current Navy/Marine Corps doctrine describes naval expeditionary forces as "capable of a full range of action—from port visits and humanitarian relief to major offensive operations."[15] These claims deserve closer examination. What exactly is meant by *expeditionary warfare*? And is it ineluctably a maritime phenomenon?

In the post-Cold War era, expeditionary warfare means the projection of military force from the continental United States to deter, compel, or defeat regional adversaries. As forward presence declines, power projection must assume a central role in national military strategy. The forms of military force will vary according to the situation and may include engineer, medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations units as well as pure combat forces. The force may be delivered by air or sea. It may proceed to its destination without opposition or be threatened by interdiction as it enters the theater of operations. It may be sustained by military or commercial sealift, by air, from prepositioned stores ashore and afloat, or by some combination of these means.

In the future, a major regional conflict requiring a serious response will feature short notice deployment of task-organized combat formations (battalion-sized airborne or Marine units or both), followed by more deliberate movement by air and sea of large combat units and associated support echelons. The force may arrive at ports and airfields still held by allies or conduct a forced entry against opposition from enemy ground forces and harassment from opposing air and naval units.

In short, expeditionary warfare is a form of joint warfare encompassing different kinds of capabilities from all the services. Power projection, forced entry, and logistical sustainment over strategic distances are not capabilities unique to a single service. They are not uniquely or even predominantly linked to naval and amphibious warfare. Marine forces are trained and equipped to conduct forced entry from the sea, but they have no monopoly on the expertise needed to move troops and equipment by sea. This the Army has done for decades and will continue to do as long as the airplane remains an inefficient platform for moving tanks and supplies.

Rightsizing the Marines

As defense budgets reach historical lows, the Armed Forces face an increasingly difficult dilemma: the military will be eroded unless roles and missions are sharply redefined to eliminate redundancies and duplications which are not absolutely essential. To preclude a hollow force, the Marines should be refocused on their true mission and core competency: spearheading amphibious assaults as experts in amphibious warfare and mounting amphibious raids and coastal operations of a maritime nature. Noncombatant evacuations contiguous to littorals, riverine operations, disaster relief in coastal areas, and similar missions call for the unique capabilities of the Marine Corps.

Structuring and funding the Marine Corps for divisional and multidivisional land operations as in the past will result in redundancy, inefficiency, and interservice

U.S. Air Force (Steve M. Martin)

MH–60 Blackhawk flying over Egypt during Bright Star.

U.S. Marine Corps (D.S. Murphy)

Refueling AV–8 Harrier in support of Agile Provider.

friction. Divided command and competing views on the best way to employ forces cannot be masked by ever louder and more frequent protestations of devotion to the creed of jointness from all quarters.

The services are different, and must be to master warfare in their defining elements. When employed together in a single operating dimension, different operating styles and methods emerge quickly and powerfully. Good intentions and a propensity for innovation have served American commanders well in overcoming such difficulties, but the efforts have all too often relied upon a healthy margin for error and suboptimal strategies and campaign plans. Today, as a growing number of people view the stated strategy of winning two nearly-simultaneous major regional contingencies as barely executable, suboptimality and faith in an ability to muddle through are not good enough.

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True joint warfare blends core competencies—on land, at sea, and in the air—to produce optimal force packages and campaign plans in aid of strategic objectives. Obvious redundancies call for careful scrutiny and review. To preclude overt redundancies in land warfare, Congress, National Command Authorities, and Joint Staff should clearly demarcate roles and missions for the Army and Marine Corps based on the principle of core business. For the Army, that means land warfare; for the Marines, that means amphibious warfare.

A fresh approach to traditional strengths and unique expertise means taking a new look at organization as well. Today the Marines field three active divisions and three active aircraft wings with organic logistics groups and air wings which comprise three MEFs.[16] The Marine Corps Reserve provides another division and aircraft wing with supporting service support organizations which is thoroughly manned with former active duty marines. A three-division Corps might well survive a thoroughly rationalized analysis of roles and missions, but not in its current form.

Since half the Marine operational formations cannot be deployed for amphibious assaults, a standing organization comprised of three divisions—two active and one Reserve—with air wings and logistics groups needed to form complete MEFs, could provide the strongest amphibious force in the world. So structured, much of the overhead in the Marine Corps could be reduced or shared within the Department of the Navy. While initial entry, infantry, and amphibious warfare training should remain exclusively Marine business, most other training could be done at Army training centers augmented with Marine training detachments, as now happens on a limited scale.

With amphibious operations back at the center of their organizational vision, emphasis on the regiment as the basic building block for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) would help refocus the service on its amphibious roots and move it away from its current orientation on major land campaigns. When needed, added armor and heavy artillery from corps level Army formations can be provided, as the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee has suggested[17] and was done in the Gulf. *In extremis*, two full-fledged MEFs would remain quickly available with another ready to stand up.[18] A two-MEF active force is prudent and realistic; the last time America needed even that many amphibious assets

Rangers making vertical landing.

U.S. Army (Daniel Hart)



Marines making amphibious landing.

U.S. Marine Corps (Maness)

was in 1945. Today, two active MEFs, backed up by one more in reserve, is the right size for America's amphibious establishment.

Sustained combat ashore has been the norm for the Marine Corps, not the exception.[19] On balance the system works, but not as smoothly and efficiently as might be anticipated if service boundaries were not involved. Longstanding areas of contention will almost certainly persist given the current roles and missions of the services, if for no other reason than that they always have. As long as the Marines fight on land alongside the Army, they will resist unified ground command. As long as the Marines control powerful air forces, they will resist unified air command. And as long as the Marines are a competing land force, they will contend for center stage in those strategic and budgetary battles that define our military institutions. By so doing, the Marine Corps obeys the iron laws of bureaucratic politics and does what it must to survive and prosper in an intensely competitive bureaucratic environment. Nevertheless institutional conflicts count on the battlefield. Unity of command, efficient use of every source of combat power to achieve concentration at the decisive point, speed in planning and execution, and many other crucial operational imperatives are inhibited, not strengthened, by these conflicts.

Such assertions are certain to draw fire from those who see the Marine Corps as the Nation's military service of choice. The essential point, however, bears repeating: the Marines do not exist to win wars—either large or small—on land. That role is settled by law and custom on the Army. As seen the Marine Corps competes aggressively not only to provide maritime intervention forces, but perhaps more relevantly, large land forces "capable of a full range of action." Such a role falls well outside the intent of the law governing service roles and missions and well outside the logic of defense budgeting in a post-Cold War world.

Overall the Marines have outperformed the other services by a wide margin in coping with downsizing. In avoiding direct clashes with the Army over roles and missions, the Marine Corps has done so largely in the interest of maintaining large ground formations configured to fight land campaigns.[20] During the Cold War redundancies in land warfare could be accepted or even welcomed in the interest of bringing more forces to the fight, but those days are gone. With a thin margin for error, the Armed Forces need clear guidance and decisive leadership about service roles and missions, and those roles should not commit two services to sustained combat operations on land. **JFQ**

NOTES

[1] Eliot Cohen, "The Future of Force and American Strategy," *The National Interest* , no. 21 (Fall 1990), p. 3.

[2] Aside from close air support, there is no justification for such fixed-wing aviation other than a desire to own one's own assets. Ostensibly acquired to support Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), F/A18s are likely to participate as land-based naval tactical aviation like the NATO air umbrella over Bosnia where no Marine ground units are deployed and land-based Air Force units are clearly the optimal force.

[3] For example, marines are often found on special operations staffs in unified command headquarters—despite the fact that they have no special operations community of their own.

[4] To support a Fleet Marine Force of about 98,000, the Marines have legislative liaison, legal, acquisition, and Reserve affairs offices—all headed by general officers.

[5] "On the morning of March 8, marines in full battle regalia splashed ashore at Danang, the first combat troops to set foot on the mainland of Asia since the end of the Korean conflict. They rushed onto the beach, just as their fathers had stormed Pacific atolls during World War II—to be greeted by grinning Vietnamese girls distributing garlands of flowers and a poster proclaiming: 'welcome to the gallant marines.'" Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), p. 416.

[6] An account of internal discussions on proposed amphibious landings in the Gulf War is found in Rick Atkinson, *Crusade* (New York: Houghton Mifflen, 1993), pp. 169–73, 239.

[7] On Saipan in 1944, LtGen Holland "Howling Mad" Smith, USMC, relieved the Army commander of the 27th Division, MG Ralph Smith, creating a storm that reached to the highest levels of the defense establishment. In Korea, relations between the Xth Corps commander, LTG Ned Almond, USA, and 1st Marine Division commander MajGen Oliver P. Smith were strained over employing Marines. The attempt to incorporate Marine air into ground operations in Vietnam precipitated another breach in service relations that was elevated to the national level and prompted GEN Westmoreland to consider resigning. ["I was unable to accept that parochial considerations might take precedence over my command responsibilities and prudent use of assigned resources." William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 344. See also, Willard J. Webb, "The Single Manager for Air in Vietnam," *Joint Force Quarterly*,

no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 88–98.] The decision by the Marine commander of the Khe Sanh combat base not to relieve the beleaguered Special Forces camp at Lang Vei precipitated a deep rift that persisted for years. Army and Marine relations in Vietnam were so troubled that General Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland's successor as Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and later Army Chief of Staff, refused to consider a senior Marine officer as his deputy. Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt!* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 208–09. In Grenada this author noted the frustration of Army ground commanders over the JTF commander's refusal to place the single Marine battalion under unified ground command, complicating Army attempts to coordinate unit boundaries on the small island among six battalions with the lone Marine contingent. In Panama, marines expressed frustration at having all but token forces in the initial assault, despite the lack of a requirement for amphibious operations. See Bernard E. Trainor, "Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), p. 71. For an account of Army concerns over the lack of a Joint Force Land Commander in the Gulf, see Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 140–41.

[8] "Protracted continental operations require a functioning logistics pipeline and in-theater reception and distribution system. This latter is a function of the Army." Department of the Navy, FMFM1–2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in National Defense* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 3–11.

[9] The attempt to expand Marine logistical capabilities is apparent but somewhat confusing, even for Marine publicists. For example, one authoritative source touts the ability to deploy a MEF "complete with 30 days of supply" on one page, and then expands this to "capable of 60 days of sustainment, Marines are the one force that does not have to be reshaped to meet the expected threat" four pages later. See *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Issues* (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), pp. 16, 20.

[10] See James Longo, "The Smaller Corps," *Navy Times* (February 24, 1992), p. 1.

[11] U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Concepts and Issues*, p. 16.

[12] Assertions by senior Marine leaders that very large numbers of marines can be moved to a crisis scene in a matter of days should not be viewed uncritically. For example, one official text maintains that "a force of 45,000 marines—complete with 30 days of supply and over 300 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters—could deploy from CONUS to any littoral region in less than 14 days." This claim is disingenuous at best. It presumes that MPS shipping is close by and has not been attacked, a secured airfield is available to receive units, and amphibious assault shipping is collected in sea ports of embarkation when the crisis erupts. These assumptions may obtain in some crisis scenarios, but clearly not in most. The numbers are also somewhat misleading, giving the impression of a large number of combatant marines and aircraft. In fact, more than 35,000 of the marines in the MAGTF serve in support, not combat, roles while more than half of the aircraft referred to have noncombat roles in transport, refueling, electronic warfare, etc. Ibid.

[13] William S. Huggins, "Forcible Entry in the Age of Jointness," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 78, no. 3 (March 1994).

[14] The Marine position on the subject is unequivocal: "If a crisis does require a heavy land-based army . . . the MAGTF will be the enabling element for their introduction." U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Concepts and Issues*, p. 21.

[15] Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps, ". . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century" (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1992), p. 5.

[16] This force is further organized into eight infantry regiments and a total of 24 infantry battalions. Supporting armor, engineers, air defense, reconnaissance, and artillery are organic to the MEF. Seven battalions are deployed at any one time as the infantry component of MEUs, which also have supporting aviation, artillery, and logistics. Marine aviation consists of 29 active helicopter squadrons and 33 active fixed wing aviation squadrons (F/A18, AV8B, KC130, and EA6B). Fact sheet, USMC element, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Summer 1993.

[17] Senator Sam Nunn in *The Congressional Record* (Washington: Government Printing Office, July 2, 1992).

[18] Marine Reserve forces are considerably more ready than Army National Guard forces for the simple reason that most Marine Reservists have served previously on active duty, unlike Guard personnel. The Marine Corps also furnishes large active duty advisory teams.

[19] It is true that the Marine Corps has conducted numerous small actions over the years that cannot be classified as "sustained land combat." However, these operations (such as landing on Koh Tang Island during the *Mayaguez* incident or evacuating noncombatants from Mogadishu) cannot be used to justify a robust force structure.

[20] The Marines devote an entire manual, FMFM1–1, *Campaigning*, to waging extended campaigns on land. Though the text includes case studies of such major land operations as the German invasion of Poland, Grant's campaigns in Virginia, and Allied operations in northwest Europe, there is virtually no mention of cooperative ventures with the Army within the context of modern operations and only passing mention of the joint nature of modern warfare: "[A] MAGTF may be required to conduct a campaign . . . as part of a larger maritime campaign or as part of a larger land campaign by a JTF. In some cases the MAGTF may itself be the JTF headquarters." FMFM1–1, *Campaigning* (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1990), p. 29.